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On Jan. 1, 1981 the Soviet Union's Eleventh Five Year Plan (1981-85) 
began. An analysis of the new plan provides some insights into Soviet 
priorities and economic prospects for the next half decade. The following 
are the plan's main goals: to allocate sufficient investment funds to ensure 
adequate growth of output in industry, agriculture, transportation, energy, 
and other sectors; to raise consumer income sufficiently to provide needed 
incentives and increase consumer satisfaction; to meet security needs at home 
and abroad; and to import technology, grain and other goods needed to meet 
priority domestic goals. Since the Soviet Union is entering a decade of 
possibly deepening economic malaise, many Western analysts believe that the 
Soviets will find it difficult to achieve even the fairly modest goals of the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan with the means available to them. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
A Soviet five-year plan sets out the Soviet Union's basic goals for 
overall economic development and individual sectors. These are initially 
outlined in the Draft Directives, which are later approved formally by the 
highest bodies of the Party and State -- in most cases after the beginning of 
the actual plan period. In this particular case the delegates to the 
Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, held February 23 to March 3, 1981 in Moscow, 
discussed and approved the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. On March 5 ,  the Plan as 
approved .by the Congre'ss was ,published. Aside from changes in wording, a few 
revisions of plan targets, and the specification of a new minimum wage'of ' 8 0  
rubles per mcnth, the revised version of the plan was not much different from 
the Draft Guidelines. This was surprising since the Graft Guidelines were 
much less detailed than usual. On Nov. 20, 1981, the final version of the 
Plan, which was approved by the Central Committee of the Party on November 16 
and the Supreme Soviet on November 19, was published. While many of the 
details are still missing, there are significant differences between the 
final and draft versions of the plan -- notably a further reduction in the 
rate of growth of planned investment. 
Typically, a Soviet five-year plan is fairly aggregated; for instance, the 
current plan gives a target for grain without specifying targets for the 
various kinds of grain (e.g., wheat, rye). The annual plans are "fit" into 
the five-year plans. Disaggregated targets for the production of individual 
commodities are set; and productive units (e.g., enterprises, collective 
farms) are given specific, binding output targets. Characteristically, 
however, output targets for annual or five-year plans are quietly raised or 
lowered during the course of the plan. 
The economic picture facing the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan is by no means favorable. During the 1950s the 
Soviet economy was growing faster than most industrial economies. In 1960 
~ h r u s h c h e v  boasted that the U.S.S.R. would overtake the United States in most 
meaningful economic indicators within the next two decades. However, the 
Sixties and Seventies proved to be decades of continuously decelerating 
economic growth and sharply rising demand. On the eve of the 1980s the 
Soviet Union faces not just a continuation of this persistent slowdown, but a 
sharp deterioration in performance coupled with markedly increased demands, 
signifying not just malaise but perhaps an economic crisis. 
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Projected Performance of Soviet Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
The Eleventh Soviet Five-Year Plan (1981-85) projects a modest slowdown in 
economic growth and postulates an ability to cope with the competing needs of 
investment for growth, consumption for labor incentives and citizen 
satisfaction and security programs for defense-establishment needs and 
control institutions. Even though it is a pragmatic and modest plan, most 
Western specialists feel that its stated ends cannot be attained with the 
means indicated, which are limited, as suggested below: 
Resource Allocation -- The 2.6% average annual rate of 
growth of investment -- projected in the draft version 
was already the lowest in the postwar era. But, in the 
final version projected capital investment was reduced 
by 30 billion rubles. This 
makes dividing the slowly growing 
investment pie a critical problem. Either some priority 
civilian economic programs must be shortchanged or more 
investment must be diverted from consumption or defense. 
Less for consumption would lead to austerity, possible labor 
productivity problems and perhaps political unrest. Reduced 
defense priority would be unprecedented, and, hence, unlikely 
Increasee deliveries of oil at reduced prices to 
Poland, advances of hard currency to pay some of 
the interest on Poland's debt to the West, and 
Poland's failure to meet delivery obligations for 
coal an8 machinery were an additional burden on 
Soviet resources in 1981 and may continue in 1982. 
This is the first five-year plan in which the planned 
rate of growth of national income -- 18% -- is greater 
than that of investment -- in this case 10.4%. 
(2) Economic Reform -- decentralizing econonic decision-making 
or adopting Western systems of management to increase 
efficiency may be too drastic politically and disruptive in 
the.short run. The.increased role of private agriculture 
is a singular departure from past plans. 
(3) System Modernization -- movement towards world levels of 
capital efficiency, labor productivity and quality of output 
is planned. Since the labor force will grow at a slower 
rate (about 0.5% annually) than in the past, increases 
in labor productivity are to account for 90% of the 
growth of national income. 
A Soviet "economic miracle" is sought, but 
elusive. 
(4) Western Technology and Credit -- a critical element for the 
priority sectors of energy, agricultural equipment, transport 
equipment, petrochemicals/chemicals, computers, but must be 
effectively absorbed and utilized, a traditional Soviet 
problem area. The final version of the plan called for a modest 
increase of 2.3% in trade with developed and developing 
non-socialist countries. But, it should be noted that trade 
with the Western industrialized countries commonly exceeds 
Soviet plans. 
The priority sectors of the Plan are energy, agriculture, transportation, 
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metallurgy and machine building, petrochemicals and chemicals, and computers. 
Plans for these priority sectors are impressive, but the outlook for 
fulfillment is questionable. The Soviets' plans for these priority sectors 
and the likely problems that will arise in connection with them are outlined 
below: 
Energy: If completed, the plan would expand the Soviet Union's 
role as an energy exporter. The Plan calls for a continued 
increase in primary energy output by means of a modest 
increase in oil output, an increase of 45% in natural gas 
production, an increase in coal use via Siberian thermal 
stations and long distance-high voltage transmission; 
long-distance electrical transmission from hydro 
stations with new industries to be located on site; 
an all-out atomic electric power program; and further 
emphasis on developing a national electric power grid. 
Nuclear and hydro sources are to furnish 70% of the 
increment in electric power generation. In the European 
part of the Soviet Union nuclear power is to supply 
100% of the increment. New nuclear power plants are to be 
built in populated areas. A pipeline to bring gas from 
the Urengoi field in Siberia to the European natural gas 
network and new pipelines to bring Siberian gas to 
the central regions of the Soviet Union are also planned. 
Agriculture: The draft plan's targets for grain, meat, 
and other quality foods presupposed 5 years of good 
weather despite the experience 
of previous five-year plans, in which one or two years 
have been poor crop years. In the final version 
the target for average annual grain production during 
the 5 years covered by the plan was set at the lower 
end of the range originally planned (see Table 2). Due 
to the poor harvest during the first year of the plan, 
achieving even this target will be difficult. Equally 
optimistic are the .plans for meat production in 1985, 
which were increased in the final Version. 
New land in Russian areas is 
to be developed. Agribusiness-type organization is 
emphasized. Increased output and efficiency are to 
result from improvements in fertilizer deliveries, 
transport, storage, and infrastructure. 
A plan to raise food production was announced in 
October 1980 and was to have been incorporated 
in the Draft Guidelines. In May 1982 Brezhnev 
presented some of its major features to the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party. They included 
the following: (1) some incentives for farm workers 
and specialists; (2) some devolution of managerial 
responsibility from the ministries to raion (district) 
agricultural-industrial complexes (RAPO); and (3) 
a pledge to increase the share of investment devoted 
to agriculture from 27% to 33% during the Twelvth 
Five-Year Plan - not during the current plan. 
Transportation: Serious bottlenecks in rail transport 
developed during 1979 due to poor weather. Since the 
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outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, the latter's exports 
have been diverted to the land route across the USSR, 
exacerbating rail transport bottlenecks. In addition, 
the long-term buildup of the transportation overload 
in Siberia and the North, where energy an8 other materials 
are found, continued. Brezhnev's November 1979 
call for assigning high priority to improving transportation 
was not reflected in the Plan. Plans in this sector 
include completion of the Baikal-Amur 
railroad, conversion of 3,000 miles of track from 
diesel-fired to electric, and containerization of all lines. 
Modest improvement in auto transport with more trucks 
from Kama and some new roads is also planned. 
Metallurgy and Machine Building: In a noteworthy departure 
from previous Soviet practice, a target for steel 
production was not released. The Plan did, however, set 
a target -- 118 MMT -- for rolled steel. Significantly, 
this target is no higher than the 1980 target. Rolled steel 
requirements for pipe, machine building and construction 
appear to exceed planned production, however. Some 
additional quality steel may be obtained from Western 
suppliers and, in the medium-term, from the new Polish 
steel mill at Katowice. New metallurgical 
developments are planned in East Siberia. The metallurgy project 
at Kursk, which was initially feztured in the Ninth (1971-75) 
Five-Year Plan, has apparently been further postponed. 
Petrochemicals and Chemicals: A shift ,of energy intensive 
output from East Europe and European Russia to energy 
surplus Siberian areas is contemplated. The plan emphasizes 
fertilizer output for agriculture. 
The omission of the Orenburg petrochemical 
plant from the Plan is puzzling in view of the high 
priority that petrochemicals have traditionally enjoyed 
in the Soviet Union. 
Computers: Continued expansion toward a national economic 
reporting system, improved use of computers in plants, 
ports, mills, etc. 
In general, the above are the priority sectors. The plans are not 
detailed. Specific quantifiable commitments have not been made, suggesting 
lack of firm decisions. Even those with firm targets, e.g., energy, will 
require consistent increases in investment, imports, some administrative 
reform, defense-like priority, and a good deal of luck. But attainment of 
goals would be significant, both domestically and in foreign policy. 
To be sure, defense is an additional priority sector, but, in keeping with 
Soviet practice, the plan does not discuss it directly. The production cf 
the Soviet defense industries is included in the plans for such sectors as 
metallurgy and machine-building and motor vehicles. Total defense 
expenditures, as reported in the Soviet budgets, are believed to be 
Considerably understated. To repeat, a reduction in resources allocated to 
defense would be unprecendented and, hence, is highly unlikely. The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicts that Soviet defense spending will contirue 
to increase by about 4%-5% annually during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. 
Similarly, the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates found that an 
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annual increase of 4-5% would be consistent with other elements of the plan. 
Some observers, among them Keith Bush of Radio Liberty, argue that the 30 
billion ruble reduction in the growth of capital investments -- from the 
12%-15% projected in the Draft Guidelines to the 10.4% projected in the final 
version -- indicates that the Soviet leaders have decided on a higher rate of 
defense spending than they had originally planned. Wharton, however, argues 
that there is not sufficient information to support this inference. 
The necessity of shifting to underdeveloped, underpopulated, and 
inhospitable Siberian regions in order to increase production of energy, 
metals, and other commodities exacerbates production problems. and costs. 
(Some information on the regional distribution of production is provided in 
Table 5.) 
Some of the targets for basic economic indicators and key commodities are 
presented below. Table 1 and Table 2 show some of the changes made between 
the publication of the Draft Guidelines and the final version of the plan. 
A s  .an aid in judg.ing the feasibility of the production plans, the output of 
key industrial and agricultural commodities during 1980 and 1981 is shown in 
Table 6. 
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TABLE 1. Soviet economic indicators 
( %  annual growth) 
1981-85 1982 1982 1983 






Labor productivity in industry 
Investments 
Agricultural production 
* Downward revision of original 4% projection. 
Sources: Izvestiya ; Business Eastern Europe , Feb. 11, 1983, p. 43. 
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TABLE 2. Targets for Selected Commodities 
Draft Guidelines 1981 1985 - Final Versio 
Industry : 
Cement (million metric tons) 140-142 
Steel (million metric tons) - 
Rolled steel 
(million metric tons) 117-120 
Mineral Fertilizer (million 
metric tons) 150-155 
Energy 
Oil (million metric tons) 620-645 
Gas (billion cubic meters) 600-640 
Coal (million metric tons) 700-800 
Electrical generation 
(billion kwh) 1,550-1,600 
Agriculture : 
Grain (million metric tons) (a) 238-243 239 
Meat production (million 
metric tons) 17-17.5 18.2 (b) 
(a) Average annual production during the plan. 
(b) Production in 1985. 
Soviet foreign trade is slated to increase by 22.5% during the 
Eleventh Plan. Tables 3 and 4 present some data on Soviet trade 
during the Tenth Five-Year Plan. 
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TABLE 4. Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, 1975 and 1980 
1975 1980 




TABLE 5. Regional Production Patterns in the Soviet Union, 1980 (a) 
Central Asia 
RSFSR' and Kazakh SSE Caucasus Ukraine 
Energy Europe =Siberia= 
Oil (MMT) 189 315 - - 
Gas (BCM) 4 2  . 
coal (MMT) 95 
Metallurgy 
Iron Ore 
(MMT) 51 16 25.8 
Steel (MMT) 29 15 6 
(a) Regional figures will not add to total Soviet production due to 
omission of total for the Urals, which divide the European 
and Siberian parts of the Soviet Union. 
(b) Not available or not applicable. 
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Soviet Performance During the Eleventh Five Year Plan 
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan did not get off to a particularly good start. 
Official Soviet statistics showed that increases in national income, 
industrial production, and labor productivity during 1981 fell short of plan. 
Table 6 compares the output of key commodities during 1981 with levels 
achieved in 1980. 
TABLE 6. Production of Key Commodities During 1981, 




Rolled Steel (MMT) 












(a) Calculated on the basis of 100% nutrient content. 
(b) USDA estimate. 
Coal production continued to decline, but the output of natural gas 
registered a 7% increase and exceeded the plan. Although it was 1 ton less 
than planned, the increase in oil production may be significant in view of 
the CIA prediction that output will soon peak and then decline to 500-550 MMT 
annually (the equivalent of 10 to 11 million barrels per day) by 1985. 
Due to unfavorable weather and chronic inefficiencies in the agricultural 
sector, 1981 was the third bad year in a row for Soviet agriculture. The 
Soviets have not yet formally announced how much grain was harvested, but a 
few Soviet officials have unofficially indicated that the harvest was in the 
150-158 MMT range. Even if the Soviets import the maximum amount of grain 
possible given port handling capacity (variously estimated as 42, 45, or if 
extreme measures are used 50 MMT), targets for meat and milk are unlikely to 
be met and production may decline significantly. The delay in the official 
announcement is viewed as an indication that the harvest was very 
disappointing and/or that the Soviet Union is unwilling to publicize a low 
figure at a time of high international tension. In addition, the sugar beet 
harvest was the smallest in 19 years; milk production fel.1 by a little over 2 
MMT, while meat production increased only slightly. Egg production, however, 
continued to increase. 
1982 appears to have been a better year for the Soviet grain production, 
but still quite disappointing when compared with the official production 
target of 238 MMT. Although the Soviets have not released grain production 
figures for 1982, the United States Department of Agriculture estimates this 
total at 180 MMT. Milk, egg, and butter production increased in 1982 while 
meat production (industrially processed meat) dropped slightly. 
The USSR Central Statistical Administration released its 1982 production 
figures on Jan. 23, 1983. According to the Soviets, overall industrial 
production and laSor productivity only grew by 2.8% and 2.1%, respectively. 
Item 
TABLE 7. SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION -- 1982 FIGURES 
1982 S changes over 1961 
Unit 
Electric power bn kwh* 
Oil mn tons** 
(including gas condensate) 
Gas bn cu m 
Coal mn tons 
Steel mn tons 
Rolled steel mn tons 
Steel pipes mn tons 
1ron ore mn tons 
Mineral fertilizer 
(100% nutrients) mn tons 
Plant protection 
chemicals '000 tons 
Sulfuric acid mn tons 
Synthetic rubber 
and plastics mn tons 
Chemical fiber 000 tons* 
Trucks and cars I 000 
Metal-cutting 
machine tools mn rubles 
Cement mn tons 
Paper mn tons ' 
Meat mn tons 
* kilowatt-hours 
* *  million tons million metric tons; thousand tons thousand 
Source: Pravda Jan.'23, 1983 
At the November 1982 Plenum of the Supreme Soviet, the following key 
output figures were released for 1983: 
Electric power 
Oil (including gas condensate) 
Gas 
Coal 
Rolled metal (stee.1) 
1,405 bn kwh 
619 mn tons 
529 mn tons 
723 mn tons 
106.5 mn tons 
* Note: See unit abbreviations in Chart 7 
Source: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
Soviet Union. Nov. 23, 1982. 
Production of mineral fertilizer, synthetic rubber and plastics, chemical 
fiber and meat are planned to grow this year by 5.8%, 9.1%, 9%, and 6.1%, 
respectively. Labor productivity is expected to increase by 3.0%. Likewise, 
the volume of overall industrial production is expected to grow by 3.2%. 
1983 seems to have gotten off to a positive beginning with industrial 
production and labor productivity growing in the first quarter by 4.7% and 
2.9%, respectively. These totals represent substantial gains over the 1.5% 
and 2.1% figures fcr last year's growth in those areas. Oil output increased a 
Sy 2% while the increase in gas output was 8%. In agriculture, the 
production of milk, meat, and eggs were reported to have risen by 11%, 5% and 
7%, respectively. The output of agricultural machinery likewise rose by 9%. 
Item 
TABLE 8. Soviet industrial production -- First quarter 1983 
Electric power 






















First quarter % changes over 
Unit * 1983 First qtr. 1982 
bn kwh 
mn tons 
















* See abbreviations for units above 
Source: Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta Apr. 18, 1983. p. 10. 
More recently, in mid-May, the Soviet press reported that "In general the 
plan for the four months measured by the total volume of production was 
overfilled by all union republics and industrial ministries." Increases in 
industrial production and laSor productivity were placed at 4.4% and 3.6% 
respectively over the first four months of 1982. 
Some attribute the recent improvements in Soviet productivity and output 
to Yuri Andropovvs discipline campaign. The new Soviet leader has been 
continually emphasizing the need for increased labor productivity in his 
major speeches and public addresses and has taken various measures to enforce 
labor discipline, including sending police to raid public places during work 
hours. 
Note: Although these 1983 figures represent notable improvements over 
those of the previous year, one must take into consideration the fact that 
production in the beginning of 1962 was particularly poor.) 
This "get-back-to-work-drive" appears to be one way the new Soviet 
leadership is attempting to maintain a rate of economic growth that would 
ensure ths simultaneous and continuous growth of defense, investment and 
consumption. It seems that the projected rates of growth for the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Five-Year Plans will be inadequate. Other possible methods for 
stimulating economic growth may include: improvement in industrial 
efficiency by correcting imbalances within key sectors, e.g., transportation; 
investment in new industrial equipment; and build-up of agricultural 
infrastructure. Furthermore, Andropov appears to be in the process of both 
making extensive personnel changes throughout the economy with the intent of 
increasing professio'nalism .,and adopting a more centralized approach to 
economic decisionmaking, focusing on the local level. More structural 
changes nay be in the offing, a s  suggested by the leader's stress on "drawing 
upon world experienceff, e.g., the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, to 
improve economic performance. 
In terms of foreign economic relations, the new Soviet leadership has 
expressed an interest in engaging in more trade outside of the Eastern bloc. 
What they appear to want from advanced industrial countries is equipment, not 
products. This desire for equipment also appears to be true in terms of 
Soviet trade with Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has traditionally been a 
major supplier of machinery to the U.S.S.R. 
The new Plan suggests a number of questions: 
(1) Will the Soviets be able to allocate enough resources to 
industry, agriculture, and transportation to attain goals? 
Will consumption and/or defense be held down? 
(2) Which economic sectors will, in practice, be given 
adequate resources and which held back? Can the Soviets 
afford to hold back the lower priority sectors and suffer 
the consequences of the resulting shortfalls and 
bottlenecks? 
(3) How will consumers do better without emphasis on consumer 
industries? What if real income does not increase? 
(4) How can they cope with the regional resource disequilibrium 
in which the primary energy and non-energy resources are 
located in Siberia, the only growing labor pool is in the 
Central Asian Republics of the South, but the majority of 
industry remains in the developed European regions west 
of the Urals? (See Table 5 above.) 
( 5 )  Can Soviet society adjust to a low growth/no growth 
environment, if that is the consequence of current policy 
and realities? 
(6) How will the leadership change -- affect 
economic plans and performance? 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
05/15/83 -- Official production figures for the first four 
months of 1983 were released. 
01/31/83 -- The new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov paid an unexpected 
visit to the Orzhonikidze Machine Tool Factory, where 
he answered workers' questions and stressed the need 
for improved labor discipline. 
12/23/82 -- The Central Statistical Board released the final 
economic and production figures for 1982. 
11/23/82 -- The 1983 Plan was discussed at the Plenum of the 
Supreme Soviet. 
11/22/82 -- Yuri Andropov spoke critically of the Soviet 
economy, citing labor productivity and economic 
organization and administration as particularly 
problematic. 
07/21/82 - The official Soviet news agency, Tass, reported that 
Soviet industrial growth was only 2.7% during the 
first six months of 1982 instead of the 4.7% 
targeted for 1982. 
05/.24/82 -- At a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party 
Brezhnev presented some of the major provisions 
of a plan to increase agricultural production. 
01/23/82 -- Plan fulfillment report for 1981 issued. 
11/20/81 -- Final version of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
published. 
11/17/81 -- In a speech to the Supreme Soviet the Chairman of 
the State Planning Commission, N.K. Baibakov, 
revealed a few of the targets for the 1982 annual 
plan. 
11/16/81 -- Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party held. 
03/05/81 -- The Eleventh Five-Year Plan was published in revised form. 
03/02/81 -- The delegates to the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union formally approved the Five-Year 
plan, as revised. 
12/02/80 -- Draft G u i d e U n e s  for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan were 
published in Pravda an8 Izvestia. 
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